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Summary 
Although prospects for peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Africa have significantly im-
proved since the end of the East-West conflict, creating the conditions for lasting peace 
nevertheless remains a challenge. On the positive side, we note in particular the changed 
constellation of paradigms and actors. The present constellation is characterized by a 
shared ideological frame, often referred to as liberal peace, which has the potential to 
guide interventions by a wide range of external actors in local conflicts. Most striking has 
been the emergence of strong regional security organisations (RSOs) as providers of secu-
rity. Their unique authority, their propensity for rule-based behaviour and their linkages 
to the UN and with each other raise hopes for the creation of an effective system of secu-
rity governance. On the less positive side, we note that effectiveness remains a hope, 
rather than a given, because it depends on a genuinely shared interpretation of global 
norms by an increasing number of international actors and compliance in implementa-
tion, as well as on the adequacy of the global scripts for addressing local conflicts. 
This report contributes to the debate on the effectiveness of peacekeeping/  
peacebuilding on the African continent by analysing the policies and activities of the Afri-
can Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) as well as some of its member states re-
garding two global norms: a) Protection of Civilians (POC) as one task of peacekeeping 
operations and b) Security Sector Reform (SSR). The peacekeeping missions in Darfur 
and Chad and the SSR efforts in Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe serve as examples of the 
organisations’ involvement. Based on the analyses, the report finds that the similar inter-
pretation of UN, EU and AU doctrines on peacekeeping and peacebuilding is promising 
and can be considered an indicator that a layered system of global security governance 
based on strong and connected RSOs could be both effective and legitimate. However, 
this alignment of doctrines remains fragile and does not always translate into increased 
effectiveness at the local level.  
The report identifies three classes of frictions that hamper the translation of global 
scripts into effective local solutions: (a) global norms suggesting policy responses, which 
do not match local challenges and needs, (b) global norms being translated into practice 
by international actors but not compatible with the traditions and interests of local actors 
and thus not penetrating deeply enough to the local level to affect the behaviour of respec-
tive actors, and (c) regional actors adopting global norms in formal terms but implement-
ing them in ways that compromise the intent of the norm. The observed discrepancy be-
tween growing harmony among UN, AU and EU peacebuilding at the level of doctrines 
and persistent discord over its implementation, as well as the partial misalignment be-
tween global policy responses and local needs and interests, should thus serve as a warn-
ing that alignment of doctrines should not be confused with more effective security gov-
ernance in practice. 
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1.  Introduction 
During the past two decades, international actors have considerably increased their efforts 
to prevent violent conflicts in Africa and creating the conditions for lasting peace. This 
engagement is reflected, inter alia, in the number of peacekeeping operations, which rose 
from four in the period from 1945 to 1990 to over 30 between 1991 and 2012, of which 25 
have been UN-led operations. In qualitative terms, the manner in which keeping and 
building peace has also changed dramatically. Present-day involvement of the interna-
tional community in local conflicts differs in three important ways from the pre-1990 
period. First, the number of external actors has increased. During the Cold War, only a 
limited number of external actors – a feeble UN and strong superpowers (including allies 
like Cuba) as well as former colonial powers – influenced security dynamics in Africa. In 
contrast, today’s international peacebuilding community includes a very active UN, vari-
ous regional as well as extra-regional states and, most notably, an array of regional and 
extra-regional security organisations (RSOs) such as the EU, the African Union (AU) and 
African sub-regional organisations (Diehl 2007; Diehl/Lepgold 2003). Located between 
the global and the state level, RSOs supply or withhold crucial legitimacy for interventions 
(Bellamy/Williams 2011), develop regional codes of conduct for peacebuilding, and pro-
vide military or civilian power for the management of conflicts (Williams/Haacke 2011; 
Kirchner/Dominguez 2011).  
Second, the depth of international actors’ involvement in local conflicts has changed. 
During the Cold War, their engagement did not challenge the internal political make-up 
of states in Africa. While traditional peacekeeping was basically confined to the observa-
tion of fragile truces, the engagement of the superpowers and former colonial powers 
aimed not at reforming, but at propping up or undermining existing local regimes. In 
contrast, today’s broader understanding of peacekeeping/building legitimizes more intru-
sive interventions by outside actors. While peacekeeping has become more robust, includ-
ing inter alia the protection of civilians, peacebuilding even entails the transformation of 
those political, economic and social conditions which have led to violent conflicts in the 
first place. In this respect, several commentators have observed the emergence of a liberal 
peace doctrine whose constituent parts include democratization, human rights, civil soci-
ety, rule of law, and economic liberalization (Richmond/Franks 2009: 3; Paris, 2010). In 
brief, liberal peacebuilding assumes that lasting and just peace can be generated through 
controlled social and political change along predefined lines. Third, and most important-
ly, the constellation of intervening parties has changed. While the former pattern of an-
tagonistic interventions by superpowers has exacerbated and perpetuated many local con-
flicts, today’s universal acceptance – at least in principle – of a UN-sponsored script 
providing directions for peacekeeping and peacebuilding interventions has improved the 
potential for international actors to work hand-in-hand as parts of a layered peace archi-
tecture with the UN at the top (Bellamy/Williams 2005). 
These quantitative and qualitative changes have significantly improved the prospects 
for effective peacekeeping and peacebuilding on the African continent. Yet, effective 
policy responses to instability and violent crisis remain a promise rather than a given, as 
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effectiveness depends (a) on a genuinely shared interpretation of global norms by an in-
creasing number of international actors as well as compliance in implementation, and  
(b) on the adequacy of the global scripts to address local conflicts. 
Even the first requirement is not as easily fulfilled as may seem at first glance. Alt-
hough the emergence of a global normative frame has improved the chances for coordi-
nated policy responses, it still has to be ascertained to what extent relevant international 
actors interpret and implement global norms and concepts in similar ways. In fact, such a 
common understanding is rather unlikely, given the inherent contradictions of the liberal 
peacebuilding programme (Paris/Sisk 2009; Paris 2010: 343; Richmond 2005) as well as 
contradictions between global norms and pre-existing regional security traditions, per-
ceptions, norms and practices (Acharya 2009).  
Secondly, even if international actors interpret emerging global norms in the same 
way, their implementation might not necessarily lead to adequate policy responses. Fric-
tions might emerge either because the global script does not provide adequate remedies 
for local conflicts or because global scripts are not in step with or attuned to local tradi-
tions, expectations and interests and international actors, when implementing policies, 
prove incapable of reconciling global norms with local conditions.  
This report contributes to the debate on effective peacekeeping/peacebuilding on the 
African continent by analysing the policies and activities of the African Union (AU) and 
the European Union (EU) as well as some of its member states with regard to two global 
norms: (a) Protection of Civilians (POC) as one task of peacekeeping operations, and  
(b) Security Sector Reform (SSR). The focus on the AU and the EU is due to the signifi-
cantly increased role of both organisations in peacebuilding on the African continent. 
Both organisations have established a close working relationship with the UN and both 
undertake to act according to global norms. Moreover, they depend on each other. While 
the AU depends heavily on the material support of the EU (Gänzle/Grimm 2010), the EU, 
claiming to facilitate ‘African solutions to African problems’, depends on the provision of 
legitimacy by the AU.  
The paper will proceed as follows: we will a) reconstruct the respective global norms 
and their interpretation by the EU and AU, and b) discuss to what extent and with what 
consequences these norms have been applied by African and European actors in situa-
tions of crisis. The paper will focus on AU and EU peacekeeping missions in the wider 
Darfur conflict (AMIS and EUFOR Chad/CAR) and SSR peacebuilding efforts by Euro-
pean actors in Sierra Leone and by African actors in Zimbabwe. 
A comparative analysis of the emerging POC and SSR norms promises to produce in-
teresting results because the norms vary with regard to their intrusiveness. The protection 
of civilians has two dimensions – the prevention of human-rights abuses by peacekeeping 
troops and the protection of civilians from violence committed by armed non-state actors 
as well as armed formations under the control of the government. This constitutes a 
challenging task for peacekeepers. Yet, the implementation of the POC norm leads to 
political conflicts between international actors responsible for peacekeeping and local 
holders of power if forces of the latter engage in violent acts against civilians and  
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perpetrators are effectively confronted. SSR is aimed both at the civilian control of forces 
and the re-organisation of the military under democratic auspices. In many cases, the 
latter aspect of SSR will prove especially controversial as it interferes directly with existing 
political structures and hierarchies.  
We will analyse the implementation of POC doctrines by using the example of the 
AMIS and EUFOR Chad/CAR missions because both aimed at the protection of civilians 
and took place in the same conflict setting. With regard to the implementation of SSR 
doctrines by European and African actors, we decided to look at a significant European 
engagement in Sierra Leone as well as the most important case of African SSR, the in-
volvement of the South African Development Community (SADC) in Zimbabwe after the 
conclusion of the Global Political Agreement in September 2008. In analysing engage-
ment by African actors, we are confronted with the dilemma of the AU having developed 
(though not yet officially adopted)1 a SSR doctrine yet so far not having been involved in 
assisting reform programmes in any African country. SADC, on the other hand, has been 
assigned, together with the AU, to supervise the political transformation in Zimbabwe 
including reform of the security forces, but has so far not developed a SSR doctrine. As a 
first step, SADC Parliamentary Form (SADC PF) has at least urged the sub-regional or-
ganisation to adopt the AU Policy Framework on SSR as soon as it has been adopted by 
the AU itself (OSISA 2012). We therefore decided to look at SADC’s SSR policy in Zim-
babwe as it is the only case which can shed some light on future African SSR practices. 
With regard to European actors, we chose the case of security sector reform in Sierra Leo-
ne, where the United Kingdom took the lead. The British efforts preceded and influenced 
European standards. They are an early example of European SSR efforts in Africa and 
guided later attempts by the EU and by other European states. Our aim was not to carry 
out a structured comparison of these cases. Instead, our approach is more modest and 
aims at empirically exploring rifts that might emerge whenever international actors im-
plement global scripts. 
2. Protection of Civilians in Peacekeeping: Convergence  
of Doctrines and Practices 
The recent emergence of doctrines on protection of civilians (POC) as a major objective 
of peacekeeping operations reinforces a trend in international peacekeeping extending 
beyond state security and stressing the importance of multidimensional peacebuilding, 
including human security and human rights as critical components for sustainable peace. 
This development has important ramifications for the planning and legitimacy of peace-
keeping missions. While the UN has been at the forefront of this development, both the 
AU and EU are emulating this trend by developing POC concepts of their own. On the 
 
 
1  The document has been agreed politically. At the point of writing, the AU secretariat was in the process of 
harmonizing the different translations of the text (see ASSN Newsletter, April 2012).  
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following pages, we will briefly recapitulate the emergence of POC concepts at the UN 
level and their adoption at the regional level. 
Since the Cold War, UN peacekeeping practice has changed significantly, with the 
emphasis on the protection of civilians being one of the recent developments. Originally 
designed to secure fragile peace agreements between conflicting parties, before 1990 
peacekeeping constituted a rather passive undertaking. Three core principles stipulated 
that (a) a precondition to the deployment of UN peacekeeping troops was the consent of 
the main parties to the conflict, that (b) any peacekeeping mission needed to adhere to 
impartiality, which at the time was interpreted as entailing the equal treatment of the 
parties, and that (c) the use of force by the peacekeeping troops was not allowed unless for 
the purpose of self-defence. Although the norms codified in the UN Charter, humanitar-
ian law and human rights conventions, as well as the principles of consent, impartiality 
and non-use of force still guide peacekeeping today, their interpretation has changed. The 
failures of missions in Somalia and former Yugoslavia as well as the policy of the UN De-
partment of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in Rwanda called for a redefinition of the 
purposes and methods of peacekeeping. The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace 
Operations, better known as the Brahimi Report after the panel’s chairman Lakhdar Bra-
himi, constitutes the major work commissioned to work out such a redefinition. Con-
fronted with the problem of ineffectiveness both concerning the execution of the man-
dates as well as the fulfilment of the superior aim of the mission, namely to secure lasting 
peace and provide security for the people, the panel arrived at two main conclusions 
(UNSC 2000: paras. 48–64): Firstly, peacekeeping should attain a more robust character 
in order to fulfil the purpose of the missions. Secondly, robustness need not contradict the 
guiding principles but merely calls for their reinterpretation. Thus, once the UN interven-
tion has been consented to, parties to the conflict must not undermine the execution of 
the mandate by manipulating the mission. Impartiality, in turn, does not necessarily en-
tail the equal treatment of the parties but, rather, stipulates unconditional adherence to 
the mandate, which might, depending on the conduct of the parties, lead to varying 
treatment. Furthermore, in addition to its use in self-defence, force may also be deployed 
for the purpose of defending the mandate.  
In humanitarian discourses, awareness of the protection of civilians (POC) as a com-
plex and highly political task had already developed in the 1990s and was provided with a 
rights-based definition by the ICRC in 1996, according to which POC encompasses ‘all 
activities aimed at ensuring full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with 
the letter and spirit of the relevant bodies of law (human rights law, international hu-
manitarian law and refugee law)’ (ICRC 1999: 21). In the realm of peacekeeping, POC is 
an emerging norm and its interpretation is still being debated. There is also no consensus 
on the operationalization of POC in armed conflicts among UN bodies, with OHCHR on 
the one hand demanding a legal protection approach that focuses on the conduct of UN 
troops as well as the monitoring and reporting of human rights violations, and DPKO on 
the other hand conceiving of protection primarily as the provision of physical security 
(Stensland/Sending 2011: 36). In 2010, DPKO published a POC concept going beyond the 
humanitarian definition by including the political process and physical protection as es-
sential elements (UN DPKO/DFS 2010). Similarly, OCHA regularly briefs the UNSC on 
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POC and, in its latest Aide Memoire (2011), underlined the constructive role peacekeep-
ing troops can play in POC if clear strategies are developed, coordination with civil bodies 
strengthened, troops appropriately trained and sufficient resources provided. Although 
still a young norm, implementation of POC in UN peacekeeping is proceeding fast: While 
the UN mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL 1999–2005) was the first peacekeeping mis-
sion with an explicit protection mandate, fourteen missions are operating under protec-
tion mandates today (AU 2011: 5). 
The Capstone Doctrine (UN DPKO/DFS 2008: 2.3) considers POC a “core business” of 
peacekeeping and the New Horizon, the latest non-paper on peacekeeping issued by 
DPKO and the Department of Field Support (DFS), reiterates the importance of robust 
peacekeeping and the inclusion of POC in the peacekeepers’ tasks, yet emphasizes the 
need for more clarity in operational guidelines as well as for more political will for these 
to be implemented successfully (UN DPKO 2009: 21). However, the shift to robust peace-
keeping and the deployment of missions to crises where peace is fragile and the political 
situation highly complex also necessitates increasing resources. As the UN does not pos-
sess the requisite capacities, the New Horizon emphasizes the importance of partnerships 
with other relevant stakeholders in peacekeeping activities, among which the EU and the 
AU are considered key partners (ibid., vi). The demand for more cooperation is not new 
but had already been articulated by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 1992 Agenda for Peace 
(A/47/277, VII). However, due to the current overstretch of UN peacekeeping capacities 
the need for carrying out peacekeeping under Chapter VIII has become more urgent (UN 
DPKO/DFS 2009: 4). To ensure effectiveness despite the proliferation of actors, coordina-
tion of the organisations’ activities and coherence in their strategic approaches and objec-
tives are needed. To this end, the UN has developed common declarations and plans re-
garding peacekeeping activities with both the AU and the EU, yet emerging norms such 
as the shift to robust peacekeeping and wider interpretation of the POC norm remain 
issues where the organisations nevertheless diverge in their practices. 
2.1 EU Doctrine on POC 
Although the EU has so far not developed a peacekeeping doctrine, it has incorporated 
guidelines on POC into its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). While Euro-
pean states contributed to debates at the UN, the EU Council, taking into account de-
velopments at the UN, adopted preliminary guidelines on POC in EU-led crisis man-
agement operations in 2003 and revised these guidelines in 2010. This EU-UN dialogue 
is in fact part of a larger pattern of co-evolution,2 which, together with initiatives by 
smaller EU states (Jakobsen 2009) and EU institutions, influenced the character of 
 
 
2  Other examples of UN norms having been mainstreamed into CFSP are the guidelines on Children in 
Armed Conflict, the conclusion on promoting gender equality and gender mainstreaming in crisis  
management, and the document on ‘Mainstreaming human rights across CFSP and other EU policies’. 
www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/hr/news66.pdf (1.11.2012). 
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CSDP significantly. To understand the significance of this convergence, one has to take 
the different points of departure into account. While the doctrine, and less so the practice, 
of UN peacekeeping has become more robust, compared with its rather timid origins, EU 
peacekeeping, which was originally envisaged and practiced as robust military interven-
tions, has turned into less robust and more impartial stabilization missions. Initially, 
European defence had been devised by Britain and France with the lessons of the wars in 
the former Yugoslavia in mind, according to which humanitarian interventions should be 
based on a political/military approach that takes sides, evolves rapidly, uses forces in a 
robust manner, and is sustained in order to rebuild viable political structures. Yet, the 
initial focus on the generation of large, heavily equipped fighting forces for robust inter-
ventions was soon replaced with a more holistic approach to crisis management. Central 
CSDP doctrines such as the comprehensive concept (Johannsen 2011; Ginsberg/Penksa 
2012) and ‘Civil-Military Co-Ordination’ (CMCO) stress the nexus between peace and 
development and call for an approach which does not focus on peacekeeping as a military 
endeavour, but combines short-term mediation efforts and civil-military stabilization 
missions with structural peacebuilding activities (Council of the EU 2005a: 4). In sum, the 
emerging ‘EU approach to peacekeeping’ reflects a broad approximation of UN practices.  
The EU doctrine on POC fits this pattern of convergence. Although the 2003 guide-
lines did not offer a definition of POC, they nevertheless mirrored the legalistic approach 
of the UN at the time. POC aimed on the one hand at ensuring the proper behaviour of 
EU troops vis-à-vis local civilians and on the other hand strove to protect civilians from 
violent acts committed by local parties. Concerning the first dimension, the 2003 guide-
lines called for the development of standards, which reflect at minimum the provisions of 
the UN’s ‘Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets’. Additionally, the EU 
developed generic standards of behaviour for ESDP operations (Council of the EU 
2005b), which oblige EU personnel to fully observe international humanitarian law, in-
cluding, when applicable, the laws of armed conflict, and the laws of the host state (Coun-
cil of the EU 2005c; Arloth/Seidensticker 2007: 19). Concerning the protection of civilians 
from violence committed by third parties, the 2003 guidelines stipulated that appropriate 
steps are to be taken to create a secure environment for endangered civilians and that EU 
forces are to provide special protection and assistance for particularly endangered groups 
such as internally displaced persons, women and children (Council of the EU 2003: 2f). 
However, in this respect, the document remained vague and did not contain specific rec-
ommendations on ways to ensure physical protection.  
In contrast, the 2010 guidelines placed greater emphasis on protection against violence 
committed by third parties. Following the definition proposed by the ICRC and the Inter-
Agency Standing Committee, they define POC as ‘encompassing all activities aimed at 
obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with international 
humanitarian, human rights and refugee law’ (Council of the EU 2010: 4). While some 
observers note that the EU is leaning towards a more robust approach than the UN 
(Kjeksrud et al. 2011), more detailed examination reveals that the EU approach is in ac-
cordance with UN doctrines and even less robust than the DPKO approach. Concerning 
external measures, the paper envisages political dialogue with third parties to further in-
ternational norm development and compliance (Council of the EU 2010: 6). With regard 
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to internal measures it calls for mainstreaming POC into the planning and conduct of 
ESDP missions. Most of the measures mentioned in the report are of a political nature 
such as facilitating the political (peace) process, working with local and other interna-
tional actors, monitoring the human rights situation and reporting violations. The most 
robust measure mentioned in the paper concerns activities such as patrolling and ‘signal-
ing to potential aggressors or perpetrators of human rights violations that they will be 
held accountable’ (Council of the EU 2010: 12). 
2.2 AU Doctrine on POC 
The AU is currently developing an operational concept on the protection of civilians in its 
peace support operations (PSO). Its transition from the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU) to the AU in 2002 meant a significant increase in the legal-political and institu-
tional abilities held by the continental body, especially regarding matters of peace and 
security. Deliberately setting itself apart from its defunct predecessor, the African Union 
was provided with two main features to accomplish the envisaged shift from non-
interference to non-indifference: the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and 
the right to intervene in a member state in case of war crimes, genocide or crimes against 
humanity (AU Constitutive Act 2002: Art. 4(h)).  
The conceptualization of POC for the newly established APSA was undertaken in close 
cooperation with the UN (particularly OCHA and DPKO) and received financial support 
from various European and other overseas sources (AU 2011; AU PSC 2011: 3; AU 
2010a). It was assigned to an Inter-Departmental Working Group of the AU Commission 
in acknowledgment of the multifaceted character of the norm covering humanitarian, 
refugee, political and defence issues (AU 2011: 7). The group adopted a rights-based defi-
nition of POC close to the one set forth by the ICRC in 1996 and plans to mainstream 
POC into the entire APSA (ibid. 7, 12). So far, however, the Peace Support Operations 
Division (PSOD) has essentially been leading the process of adoption of POC in AU pol-
icy and subsequently been shaping the reception of the POC norm (AU 2011: 17). In 
2010, draft guidelines were developed on POC in peace support operations, including 
both peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions which are notably close to those is-
sued by DPKO. While the latter proposed a three-tiered approach that encompasses pro-
tection through the political process, physical protection and support for a protective 
environment, the AU guidelines add rights-based protection as a fourth tier (Kjekrud et 
al. 2011: 13; AU 2010a: 5). The focus on POC in the realm of PSO stems not only from the 
PSOD’s prominent role in the process but also from the conviction that it is in PSO where 
the AU can give most meaning to POC (AU 2011: 13). 
While Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act has never been explicitly invoked, the 
AU has deployed peacekeeping troops tasked with the protection of civilians. To date the 
AU has conducted four peacekeeping operations: the mission to Burundi (AMIB 2003-
2004), to Sudan (AMIS 2004-2006), to Somalia (AMISOM 2007-present) as well as several 
missions to the Comoros (2007-present). All but the missions to the Comoros involved 
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protection of civilians to varying degrees, although only the AU Mission to Darfur 
(AMIS) was provided with a protection mandate (Kjekrud et al. 2011: 38-39). Deploy-
ment scenarios of the future African Standby Force (ASF) emphasize that PSOs can be 
explicitly tasked with the protection of civilians (AU 2005a: 3.21, 78). In the latest pro-
gress report on the operationalization of the ASF, AU leaders on defence and security 
expressed the “need for strong political leadership that demonstrates an appetite for POC 
as a core function of peacekeeping operations” (AU 2010b: 11). 
The ASF draft doctrine, which is based on the British Defence Doctrine, sets forth a 
broad interpretation of the core peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality and non-
use of force. The consent of the parties to the conflict is not regarded in absolute but in 
relative terms, it is defined as the “degree of cooperation and willingness” (AU 2005a: 
3.35, our emphasis). Furthermore, the consent does not only relate to the deployment of 
the mission but also to the terms of the peace agreement and the fulfilment of the PSO 
mandate (ibid. 3.35). Therefore, consent may oftentimes only be partial, yet must con-
tinuously be strengthened, as it is the core requisite for self-sustaining peace (ibid. 3.35, 
3.36). Insights of the Brahimi Report clearly resonate in this conception of consent, just as 
they do concerning the interpretation of the principle of impartiality. The ASF doctrine 
explicitly stresses that impartiality does not stand for neutrality, but for an even-handed 
execution of the mandate (ibid. 3.43). In its conception of the use of force, the doctrine 
applies an even broader interpretation. Unlike the UN peacekeeping principle of non-use 
of force that is mitigated only by exceptions of use of force for the purpose of self-defence 
and defence of the mandate, the ASF doctrine speaks of the principle of minimum neces-
sary use of force (ibid. 3.48). The doctrine sets out that the use of force is allowed for self-
defence and defence of the purpose of the mission (ibid. 3.49), thus parallel to the UN 
principle, however, it also states that “in a situation of chaos or, where the parties are un-
coordinated and independent, more force can generally be used” (ibid. 3.48). For the ef-
fective execution of POC in PSO, furthermore, the use of force may be sanctioned, espe-
cially if applied in peace enforcement missions and when POC is at the core of the 
mission (AU 2011: 13, 15; AU 2010a: 6). 
Summarizing this section, we find an astonishing degree of conformance on the doc-
trinal level. Both the AU and the EU have adopted new peacekeeping norms that had 
emerged on the global level. While the EU follows closely the DPKO approach, the AU’s 
conceptual work on POC goes even one step further by declaring the aim to actively pro-
vide protection in PSOs, including through the proportionate use of force. In the next 
chapter we will ask whether and to what extent both organisations actually adhere to these 
doctrines when conducting peace operations. Additionally, we will explore whether the 
implementation of global doctrines in local contexts leads to more effective outcomes or 
to frictions and unintended consequences.  
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2.3 European Union in Chad/CAR 
So far, the EU mission to Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR Chad/CAR) 
has been the largest and logistically most demanding CSDP mission in Africa. Starting in 
January 2008, it involved the deployment of as many as 3,700 troops for exactly one year 
to secure approximately 200,000 km2 of one of the most remote, least hospitable and least 
governed parts of the world, inhabited by approximately 700,000 refugees and internally 
displaced persons. The mission’s mandate was equally extensive. UNSC Resolution 1778 
(2007) authorized EUFOR Chad/CAR under chapter VII ‘to take all necessary measures’ 
to ‘(i) contribute to protecting civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced 
persons; (ii) facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid […]; (iii) to contribute to protect-
ing UN personnel […]’. It was also the most dangerous mission putting European troops 
in the hotspot of multi-faceted conflicts involving rebels, bandits and a proxy war be-
tween Chad and Sudan. Moreover, the mission was politically contested. EUFOR 
Chad/CAR was heavily influenced by and dependent on France. In the view of the French 
political elite, the mission was closely connected to the atrocities in Darfur. Yet, being 
aware of the intimate relationship between France and Chadian President Idriss Déby, 
some of France’s partners such as Germany and the UK saw the mission as “another pet 
project in support of Francafrique” (Dijkstra 2010: 396). The seeming partiality of the 
mission was underlined by the fact that EUFOR would draw on the French national mis-
sion Epervier, which has been stationed in Chad since 1986 to shield the government 
against external and internal enemies (Charbonneau 2009: 556). Hence, most EU mem-
ber-states refused to commit troops. In fact, it took five force generation conferences to 
obtain the already reduced level of force and the troop-contributing states insisted on 
provisos, most notably a firm 12 months limit. EUFOR Chad/CAR was to be conducted 
as a military bridging operation and in close cooperation with a parallel UN mission to 
the region (MINURCAT). While the unarmed MINURCAT mission was tasked with 
training a new Chadian police unit that would assume responsibility for security in the 
refugee camps, EUFOR would provide the protective element. 
Was EUFOR Chad/CAR conducted in accordance with the emerging EU peacekeep-
ing doctrine and its focus on the protection of civilians? Or did it resemble traditional 
French interventions with a focus on regime protection? Some observers do indeed claim 
that EUFOR was essentially a classical French intervention in multilateral disguise (Berg 
2009: 67). According to this view, its effect, if not its intention, has been protection of the 
authoritarian Déby regime, not of endangered civilians (Charbonneau 2009; Haine 2011: 
595). However, closer inspection shows that EUFOR Chad/CAR does not fit this pattern. 
Exactly because European leaders were aware that EUFOR might be perceived as serving 
classical French interests, they repeatedly emphasized the ‘neutral, impartial and inde-
pendent manner’ in which EUFOR would operate (Haine 2011: 594; Seibert 2010: 14). 
These assurances were mirrored by practice on the ground. Soon after its arrival, EUFOR 
made a concerted effort to communicate to local communities its neutrality and the limi-
tations of its mandate (Kühne 2009: 26). In fact, EUFOR acted impartially, as is testified 
by President Déby’s repeated annoyance with EUFOR for allowing anti-government re-
bels free passage (Dijkstra 2010: 406; Kühne 2009: 27). Impartiality, neutrality and  
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independence were even stressed to the point that the protection of civilians was pushed 
to the background. In other words, the convergence between EU and UN peacekeeping 
doctrines was mirrored by a convergence on the practical level. EUFOR acted to protect 
civilians and UN personnel, but only if and when threats occurred while EU troops hap-
pened to be around (Mattelaer 2008: 27). Not surprisingly, observers note that the protec-
tive effect was most heavily felt in the vicinity of the five forward bases (Seibert 2010: 37). 
In general, most observers note ‘that the European forces only had a marginal effect on 
the ground‘ (Seibert 2010: 41) while some even argue that the humanitarian situation 
worsened during the deployment of EUFOR (Berg 2009: 65).  
This underachievement was due to several factors. First, local actors were allowed to 
manipulate the mission. President Déby, in particular, insisted on a restricted mandate 
that did not allow for the deployment of EUFOR within the camps or at the border, as 
originally planned. He also hampered the deployment of MINURCAT Police trainers 
(Haine 2011: 596). As the greatest threat to civilians did not result from cross-border raids 
of Darfurian militias, but from banditry within the camps to which EU forces had no ac-
cess, there was little EUFOR could do to protect endangered civilians (Seibert 2010: 25). 
Equally detrimental for the mission as such and for the protection of civilians in a broader 
context was the French failure to insist on political reforms.  
Secondly, EUFOR was weakened by self-made restrictions. By emphasizing its impar-
tiality, the mission undermined its deterrence effect vis-à-vis bandits and local armed 
groups. Moreover, the politically motivated insistence on a fixed time limit relieved the 
EU from defining a satisfactory end-state. Instead, mission planning was based on an 
end-date, irrespective of whether the situation on the ground had improved (Mattelaer 
2008: 30). In theory, EUFOR’s protective functions were to be taken over by MINUR-
CAT. In practice, the transition was poorly planned and fraught with difficulties (Dijkstra 
2010: 396). 
Thirdly, the lessons learned from EUFOR Chad/CAR point to a more systematic fail-
ure. As EU peacekeeping resembles UN practice more and more, it moves away from the 
original intention to make humanitarian interventions robust, sustainable and aimed at 
clear and achievable political objectives. It is noteworthy that as CSDP matured, EU mis-
sions became less robust. Just like EUFOR Chad/CAR, the first EU mission to Africa, 
Operation Artemis (2003) in the Ituri region in Eastern Congo, was mandated under 
Chapter VII to protect camps of internally displaced persons and the civilian population. 
During this mission, EU commanders did not shy away from using superior firepower to 
enforce the mandate and rebuff armed rebel groups (Ulriksen/Gourlay/Mace 2004). At a 
critical moment during the stabilization mission in the Congolese capital Kinshasa (EU-
FOR DR Congo) in 2006, EU troops resorted to a show of superior force in order to de-
fend the mandate. In contrast, EUFOR Chad/CAR remained mostly passive. Given the 
vast gap between threats to civilians on the one hand and EUFOR’s passivity on the other, 
it appears that as EU peacekeeping converged with UN practices, it also lost its ability to 
provide effective solutions. 
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2.4 African Union in Darfur 
The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was initially deployed as a ceasefire moni-
toring group. In Sudan, already conflict-ridden for decades, a humanitarian catastrophe 
had developed due to fighting between armed rebel forces demanding greater autonomy 
for the neglected Darfur region and forces supported by the government aiming to op-
press secessionist ambitions (Middleton/O’Keefe 2006: 547). As the Sudanese military was 
for the largest part occupied with the conflict centred in the South, the government made 
use of paramilitary forces and Arab militia, called Janjaweed, to counteract the rebels’ 
attacks on the state (Ekengard 2006: 12f). While tasked with counterinsurgency, the Jan-
jaweed’s strategy was not confined to action targeting the rebels but instead was aimed at 
civilians supposedly supporting them and resulted in countless human rights violations 
(Ekengard 2006: 13; United Nations 2005: 54). In 2005, the United Nations estimated that 
1.65 million Darfuri had been internally displaced and that 200,000 had fled to Chad 
(United Nations 2005, 3).  
Initiated by Chadian President Déby, a Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement was bro-
kered in April 2004 with the assistance of the AU between the Sudanese government 
(GoS) and the then two major rebel factions, the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army 
(SLM/A) and the Sudan Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Although the parties con-
sented to an AU ceasefire-monitoring group, AMIS, initially consisting of 60 military 
observers, found itself confronted with ongoing and massive acts of violence (Bergholm 
2009: 113). The number of troops was quickly raised and a year later the mission’s man-
date was amended to incorporate, among others, an explicit protection mandate. Never-
theless, displacement and violence against civilians continued unabated and AMIS’ minor 
achievements, e.g. through sporadic firewood patrols (Ekengard 2006: 31-34), were con-
fined to the local level, while AMIS stood out as a major failure regarding the overall pic-
ture (Williams 2009: 633). 
This failure was firstly due to the priority assigned to the consent of the conflicting 
parties in general and the government of Sudan (GoS) in particular. Khartoum, using the 
dependency of the AU and the wider peace process on its support and its seat in the AU 
Peace and Security Council when the AMIS mandate was amended, insisted on a severely 
restricted mandate, which limited the troops’ abilities to protect civilians to situations 
“under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within resources and capability, it 
being understood that the protection of the civilian population is the responsibility of the 
GoS […]” (Bergholm 2010: 22; AU PSC 2004: 6). The GoS had consented to the Humani-
tarian Ceasefire Agreement to avoid a peacekeeping mission with more powers and later 
accepted a hybrid UN-AU peacekeeping mission provided that it retained an ‘African 
character’ and that the force commander was appointed by the AU (Bergholm 2009: 108; 
de Waal/Flint 2008: 268). Confronted with this dilemma, the AU did not manage to stra-
tegically reconcile the peacekeeping principle of consent with its commitment to non-
indifference and the protection of civilians, in effect leaving the missions at the mercy of 
the GoS. 
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Yet, bending to the Sudanese government’s preferences was not the only factor imped-
ing the AU missions’ ability to effectively protect civilians. The AU mission lacked ade-
quate capacities and, furthermore, was plagued by corruption (de Waal/Flint 2008: 194). 
Thirdly, and more importantly, the mission lacked operational and tactical guidelines on 
the implementation of the protection mandate (AU 2011: 8; O’Neill/Cassis 2005). The 
lack of common Rules of Engagement meant that interpretation of the protective man-
date was left to the troop-providing states. While under the first Nigerian General, even 
before the protection mandate was in place, troops were in several instances able to pro-
tect civilians through bending the mandate (de Waal/Flint 2008: 176), they lost their 
combative attitude under successive commanders. This observation fits with the assess-
ment of Appiah Mensah, former commander of AMIS, that failure to translate AU doc-
trines into binding guidelines will result in national practices and respective national 
Rules of Engagement filling this void (Appiah-Mensah 2005). Although provided with a 
protection mandate, the AU troops in consequence used too little (threat of) force to ef-
fectively implement it (pers. comm. with a representative of the AU, 3 April). The AU had 
responded to the situation in Darfur with ‘its heart, not its head’, as an advisor to the AU 
said (quoted in de Waal/Flint 2008: 175). Eager to let the world see deeds follow the de-
claratory commitments to an involved continental organisation, and hoping to gain le-
gitimacy in the eyes of the international community, the AU engaged in a mission which 
was beyond its political, strategic and operational capacities (see CFR Interview with 
Obasanjo, Sep 2004; Bergholm 2009: 109f).  
Likewise in Somalia, considerable discrepancy between doctrinal developments on the 
continental level and behaviour on the local level appears, in this case with different con-
sequences. While adherence to international humanitarian law has been identified as an 
essential element of POC in Addis, the AMISOM troops have been repeatedly accused of 
using force indiscriminately and incurring a disproportionate number of civilian losses 
through their attacks on the militia (Human Rights Watch 2011; Amnesty International 
2011). Again, the mission has failed to improve the amount of protection for civilians due 
to the missing translation of the doctrine into operational guidelines and adherence of 
troops to the latter. The AU has recently reacted to these shortcomings, arranged a three-
day roundtable on enhancing AMISOM commitment to international humanitarian law, 
called on AMISOM to adhere to international humanitarian law and introduced an indi-
rect fire policy (AU PSC 2011: 2; UNSC 2012). While applauded for the efforts, the results 
remain to be seen.  
The above analyses of EU and AU peacekeeping missions show that even considerable 
convergence of AU and EU peacekeeping doctrines to global (UN) norms does not trans-
late directly into more effective peacekeeping on the local level. As the AU mission to 
Darfur indicates, successful translation of doctrine into practice is not self-evident. In fact, 
the AU is faced with decisive challenges in the provision of POC in its operations and 
faces allegations both of failure to effectively protect the population in its missions and to 
even fulfill the minimum ‘do no harm’ doctrine. Against this, the EUFOR Chad/CAR 
mission indicates that doctrinal convergence does not necessarily lead to greater effec-
tiveness in implementation. 
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3. Security Sector Reform: Convergence of Doctrines 
The emergence of security sector reform as a necessary component of peacebuilding 
strategies can be traced back to a speech that UK Development Minister Clare Short gave 
in 1999 at King’s College in London on ‘Security Sector Reform and the Elimination of 
Poverty’. All main principles of SSR were already mentioned: oversight of the security 
sector by civilian and democratic authorities, the right-sizing of security forces and the 
idea of enhancing knowledge about human rights and humanitarian law among security 
forces (Short 1999). The UK Department for International Development (DFID) then 
pushed the SSR concept onto the international agenda. It was under the UK’s initiative 
and leadership that SSR was discussed at the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) whose Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation (CPDC), creat-
ed in 1995, dealt with SSR-related issues even before its emergence (Bryden 2007: 65).3 
CPDC’s conceptual work4 laid the groundwork for the development of the 2007 OECD 
DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (OECD DAC 2007). Under strong leadership 
from the UK CPDC Chair, a process was initiated in 2005 with the objective of distilling 
SSR good practices and lessons learned to provide practical guidance to donor support for 
SSR programmes (Bryden 2007: 68-69). The key policy and operational commitments 
emerging from the handbook were endorsed by DAC Ministers and Heads of Agency at 
the DAC High Level Meeting in April 2007. It is currently the state-of-the-art SSR hand-
book and the blueprint for most SSR programmes all over the world. 
The OECD DAC handbook on SSR strongly influenced other international organisa-
tions’ take on SSR. The UN, EU, NATO, OSCE, ECOWAS, the Council of Europe, the 
World Bank and the IMF all developed their own sets of SSR principles – often following 
closely the OECD DAC Handbook. Even if these organisations differ in terms of geo-
graphical coverage, character and activity, they thus developed similar norm sets and 
concepts. Particularly important for the ‘universalization’ of the SSR concept has been its 
adoption by the UN. In July 2005, the Security Council Presidency recognized ‘that secu-
rity sector reform is an essential element of any stabilisation process in post-conflict envi-
ronments’ and highlighted the need for more coherent approaches by the UN and the 
international community (Scherrer 2007: 182). In the statement made by the President of 
the Security Council after the first Security Council open debate on SSR in February 2007 
under the Slovak Presidency, it was underlined that the UN ‘has a crucial role to play in 
promoting comprehensive, coherent, and coordinated international support to 
nationally-owned security sector reform programmes’ (UNSC 2007). SSR is nowadays 
 
 
3  The first set of guidelines, issued in 1997, is the aforementioned paper Conflict, Peace and Development 
Cooperation on the Threshold of the 21st Century. In 2001, the OECD DAC developed a supplement to 
these guidelines, The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict (OECD DAC 2001) which further 
elaborates on the political nature of security issues, the need for democratic oversight and accountability 
of the security sector as well as the need for a comprehensive approach to SSR. 
4  The Security and Development Nexus: Challenges for Aid (OECD DAC 2004); Security System Reform and 
Governance: Policy and Good Practice (OECD DAC 2005); Enhancing Security and Justice Service Delivery 
(OECD DAC 2007). 
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well established with an SSR Unit at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New 
York and is present in many UN missions as SSR units, for instance in East Timor, Bu-
rundi, DRC, etc. But even if there is no formal SSR unit, many other units are mandated 
to support SSR-related activity. National armies and police forces are often targeted and 
supported by policy, legal and technical advice by the UN: The United Nations Stabiliza-
tion Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), as 
well as the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), to name but a few, 
all had tasks within the realm of SSR.  
Thus, through policy developments and international interventions, the word has been 
spread – SSR is considered a key concept that has been accepted and implemented by 
almost all of the major international organisations that deal with security issues.  
3.1 The EU’s SSR concepts 
The evolution of the EU SSR concepts demonstrates that the EU is as much a recipient of 
global norms as it is a promoter of its own norms beyond Europe. While some EU mem-
ber states have been leading the way in terms of SSR norm and policy development – no-
tably the UK and the Netherlands within the UN – it took the EU some time to make 
progress in its own normative developments. This delay was due to the rivalries between 
the Council and the Commission which still hamper the concept’s efficient implementa-
tion today. SSR was included in four different agendas (conflict prevention, crisis man-
agement, good governance and enlargement). While the crisis management agenda under 
the command of the Council is geared more towards short-term actions and missions that 
deal with ‘hard’ security issues (for example, providing training and equipment for mili-
tary personnel), the other agendas are managed by the Commission and based on long-
term approaches. Facilitated mainly through the EU’s external assistance and develop-
ment programmes, they are geared towards ‘soft’ SSR norms such as transparency, de-
mocratic oversight and human rights (for example, capacity building for members of 
parliamentary committees). Both actors developed their own SSR concepts (the Concept 
for European Security and Defense Policy Support to SSR, developed by the Council of 
the EU 2005, and the Commission’s Concept for European Community Support for SSR, 
Commission 2006) that were subsequently linked though not merged under the EU Pol-
icy Framework on SSR in June 2006. This has resulted in SSR cutting across different pol-
icy areas and subsequently lacking a clear policy framework that is implemented by insti-
tutions dedicated exclusively to SSR.5 The result is what some call the cross-pillar 
challenge, identified as the biggest challenge of the EU SSR approach (Sherriff 2007: 91).6 
 
 
5  Also, SSR-related activities rarely are organised into SSR programmes and SSR is rarely mentioned as a 
programme’s objective. 
6  To date, the only examples of a coordinated EU approach to SSR implementation include the EU action 
in Macedonia and the joint planning of EU SSR activities in Guinea-Bissau and the DRC. 
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Even though both concepts differ, they resemble one another when it comes to the 
normative content of SSR. To begin with, the EU proposes a holistic approach to security 
in using the OECD’s definition of the security sector: in addition to the military as a core 
security actor, this also includes law enforcement institutions, security management and 
oversight bodies, justice institutions, non-state security forces and other non-state entities 
such as civil society organisations as well. In addition, the SSR principles and key norms 
resemble the ones already propagated by the OECD. First, local ownership is regarded as 
paramount for any success and is thus viewed as a core principle by the EU (Council of 
the EU 2005: 4; Council of the EU 2006c: 7). Second, the EU promotes the good govern-
ance of the security sector (Council of the EU 2005: 4, paragraph 1 and 2; Council of the 
EU 2006c: 7f) which entails democratic and civilian control, as well as the accountability 
and transparency of the security sector. Third, the EU demands compliance of security 
actors with internationally recognized values and standards (Council of the EU 2005: 4, 
paragraph 1, Council of the EU 2005: 9, paragraph 20). Fourth, the EU promotes the effi-
ciency and effectiveness of the security sector (Council of the EU 2005: 4, paragraph 1; 
Council of the EU 2005: 10, paragraph 25; Council of the EU 2005: 16, paragraph 41; 
Council of the EU 2006: 3).  
To sum up, EU norm development in the field of SSR is influenced from above (the 
OECD and to some degree the UN) just as much as it is from below (its member states, 
most notably the UK). In general, the EU portrays SSR as a holistic and long-term ap-
proach corresponding with its emphasis on conflict prevention, development and human 
rights. Since SSR is still a cross-cutting issue within the EU and no single EU institution is 
able to take the lead on SSR-related matters, member states often not only influence EU 
policies and implementation, but also manage to align EU programmes with their own 
SSR programmes in developing countries.7 
3.2 AU’s SSR concept 
The African Union’s response to the emerging SSR norms is influenced by two of its own 
principles. On the one hand, the AU Constitutive Act is based on a restricted interpreta-
tion of sovereignty and emphasizes peace and (human) security, together with democracy 
and good governance. On the other hand, it reflects the idea that Africa should be able to 
come up with African solutions to African problems (Selassie 1963: 285) and thus demon-
strates African emancipation from Northern tutelage (Dembinski/Reinold 2011: 11). In 
keeping with this standpoint, many African critics of the SSR concept claim that it is a 
Western concept (Hutchful/Fayemi 2005) (which often served as a vehicle for foreign 
intervention), and demanded the development of a non-Western approach to SSR. One 
important step in this regard was the Cape Town UN SSR meeting in 2007. Recommen-
dations adopted at the meeting stressed the importance of local ownership, capacity 
 
 
7  For example, the UK managed to integrate EU support for Sierra Leone within its overall strategy for 
supporting SSR there. 
16 Matthias Dembinski/Jörg Krempel/Berenike Schott 
 
 
building, and the role of sub-regional organisations. As a result of these recommenda-
tions, the AU Assembly decided to develop its own Policy Framework on SSR (AU As-
sembly Decision 177 (X) of February 2008). Subsequently, an AU SSR officer was ap-
pointed in early 2009 and a permanent office devoted to Africa’s security sector was 
established within the Defense and Security Division (Tadesse 2010: 18). The UN wel-
comed these steps and held a UN-AU consultation on SSR in Addis Ababa in March 
2009, with the aim of supporting the development of the AU SSR concept (Tadesse 2010: 
19). The draft AU Policy Framework on SSR was first presented at a meeting in Addis 
Ababa in May 2010 and has subsequently been debated in a number of consultative proc-
esses with government officials and civil society organisations. The resulting SSR concept 
is expected to be adopted by the AU Assembly soon. 
The AU debates reflect all major global SSR norms and underlying principles. The 
Post-Conflict Reconstruction/Development Policy (PCRD) features a holistic approach to 
SSR, pointing at the effectiveness and efficiency of the security sector, respect for local 
ownership, democratic and civilian control of the security sector (including transparency 
and accountability), and respect for international values such as human rights and inter-
national humanitarian law, etc. (AU 2005b). Similarly, the AU Policy Framework on SSR 
has so far identified 12 basic SSR principles. These don’t seem to differ from the UN SSR 
concept and the consultants at the meeting in Addis Ababa had difficulties identifying 
specifically African principles (Mlambo 2010: 173). 
Yet, despite the apparent resemblance, different interpretations appear. Many African 
scholars and practitioners pointed out the need for transformation, rather than reform, of 
the security sector (see especially the contributions by African scholars to Bry-
den/Olonisakin 2010). Transformation can be understood as meaning real change of behav-
iour and political structures (Bryden/Olonisakin 2010: 4). Proponents of Security Sector 
Transformation state that transformation adds to SSR the need to take African (colonial) 
history and peculiarities into consideration (Bryden/Olonisakin 2010: 9). Interestingly, the 
term transformation was used not only in the debate, but also in the Post-Conflict Recon-
struction/Development Policy (PCRD) (paragraph 25c) and figures in the draft version of 
the AU Policy Framework on SSR as well. A more substantial difference concerns the mean-
ing of local ownership. Donors, not wanting to be perceived as infringing upon national 
sovereignty, embrace this principle and portray themselves as technical facilitators, yet refer 
to global norms as guiding principles and often insist on control of expenditures (Hutton 
2009: 7), while African states demand full control of externally driven or supported SSR 
efforts (in Burundi, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, etc.).  
We thus find similar SSR concepts whose interpretation, however, differs in parts. 
While European actors promote especially those SSR norms that reflect their own tradi-
tions and interests, African actors tend to adopt an SSR concept that strongly resembles 
international blueprints, yet in some aspects carries differing meanings.  
While the adoption of SSR norms and principles at the regional level provides guid-
ance, it is at the national level that these principles are adopted, integrated into national 
legal frameworks and subsequently implemented. In the following, we examine reform 
processes in Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe, externally supported by European and African 
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actors respectively. In Sierra Leone, the UK applied for the first time its SSR policy 
frameworks which subsequently influenced the EU approach. In Zimbabwe, the South 
African Development Community’s efforts built on the emerging AU approach.  
3.3 SSR in Sierra Leone 
After the UK’s military intervention in 2000, Sierra Leone became something of a testing 
ground for European-driven efforts to reform the security sector in post-conflict coun-
tries. (Albrecht/Jackson 2010: 9). Due to the need for total reconstruction of state struc-
tures after the end of the civil war and to the UK’s massive financial engagement the ex-
ternal influence in SSR in Sierra Leone has been very strong. Great-Britain was not only 
very active in terms of military training through the UK-led International Military Assis-
tance Training Team (IMATT), but even took on an executive role during the implemen-
tation of SSR. Some British advisors assumed posts within the Sierra Leonean security 
sector. The most visible example was the British (retired) police officer Keith Biddle who 
acted as the Inspector General of the Sierra Leonean Police (SLP) and was the driving 
force behind most parts of the police reform. Additionally, hundreds of British experts 
were deployed as mentors and advisors to their Sierra Leonean counterparts (Le Grys 
2010: 42). Reform efforts concerned a) the level of policy and strategy papers, b) the legal 
framework, and c) regulatory instruments.  
At the strategy and policy level, the National Security Policy and the Poverty Reduc-
tion Strategy Paper (PRSP) as well as other documents dealing with security issues drafted 
since the involvement of the UK entail the concept of human security as well as the con-
cept of democratic and civilian control of the security sector (Ebo 2004: 56; Le Grys 2010: 
41).8 External support for the development of these papers was of utmost importance 
(Ashington-Pickett 2010: 24). The only exception to this was the Defense White Paper 
which has been mainly drafted by Sierra Leonean actors (even though input was given by 
IMATT), which, interestingly enough, was criticized by the British-run Sierra Leone Se-
curity Sector Programme (SILSEP) staff, because it called for a restructuring of the Brit-
ish-designed Command Structure of the Republic of Sierra Leone’s Armed Forces 
(RSLAF) according to local needs and culture.  
The legal and institutional reforms aimed primarily at establishing new institutions 
and reforming existing ones. For example, a National Security Council was created, com-
plemented by provincial and district security committees (PROSECs and DISECs). The 
Sierra Leonean intelligence service changed as well: the National Security and Central 
Intelligence Act 2002 led to the creation of the Central Intelligence and Security Unit 
(CISU) and installed a system of civilian and democratic oversight of the CISU. The same 
law founded the Office of National Security (ONS). The ONS serves as the secretary of the 
 
 
8  The linking of development with security also appears in the Sierra Leone Vision 2025 and the govern-
ance and corruption survey of 2002 (Osho Coker 2010: 111). 
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NSC and is the intellectual driving force behind the reform of the security sector. Intelli-
gence reform was supported by British advisors, especially the intelligence and security 
advisor (ISA) whose task was to “shepherd the passing of the National Security and Cen-
tral Intelligence Act” (Ashington-Pickett 2010: 21). This law was not so much influenced 
by British legislation directly, but by laws of other African (mainly Anglophone) countries 
(Ashington-Pickett 2010: 26), which often based their respective laws on the British mod-
els. As far as military reform is concerned, SILSEP was tasked with bringing the RSLAF 
under a system of democratic control, which is based on the UK model of dual 
civil/military command (Horn/Olonisakin 2006: 119). The most important law for the 
armed forces is the Sierra Leone Military Forces Bill of 1961, which has been changed 
many times since. The most important amendments after the beginning of the compre-
hensive SSR in Sierra Leone were adopted in 2003 with the establishment of a Board of 
Inquiry (the Board of Inquiry Rules 2003) and the reform of the court martial procedure 
(the Court Martial Procedure Rules 2003). Both reforms raised the standards of jurisdic-
tional and internal control within the RSLAF to the level of international SSR standards, 
introducing, for example, observance of international human rights standards. The re-
form of the Sierra Leonean police sector, too, has been driven mainly by external actors 
according to international standards. Reforms changed the rank system, introduced an 
internal complaint and disciplinary mechanism, established oversight through the crea-
tion of the Executive Management Board, introduced the concept of community policing, 
and determined that the essential role of the police force consists in ensuring internal 
safety (Fakondo 2010: 162–165).  
Even regulatory instruments and policies such as the 2006 Military Aid to Civilian 
Power (MACP) directive, which regulates the use of the armed forces within the country, 
were created on the basis of British models or British-based African models. What is more, 
British advisers heavily influenced the drafting of standard operating procedures as well as 
staff regulations for the military and the police forces (Ashington-Pickett 2010: 27).  
We therefore conclude that the overall reform of the security sector followed interna-
tional or in certain cases even British models. As Robert Ashington-Pickett, the British 
Intelligence and Security Advisor to the ONS and CISU from 2000 to 2003 stated: ‘organi-
sations would grow in line with their ability to absorb growth and internalize guiding SSR 
principles’ (Ashington-Pickett 2010: 24). As a consequence, Sierra Leone now has a state-
of-the-art SSR framework, which has been designed and in some cases even adopted by 
external actors.9 While laws needed to be adopted by parliament, policy papers and regu-
latory instruments were often issued by the ministries where external actors had more 
influence. Thus, it is no surprise that the major legal reforms took place at an early stage 
of the SSR where external involvement has been most keenly felt (Le Grys 2010: 55). 
In other words, most global SSR norms were incorporated in Sierra Leone’s legal 
framework. That is to say, the material or substantive SSR norms were followed while 
 
 
9  Nelson-Williams even stated that IMATT even had “the final say about the running of the RSLAF” (Nel-
son Williams 2010: 127).  
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another very important procedural norm – respecting national and local ownership – was 
not consistently observed. Respecting substantive and procedural SSR norms at the same 
time proved to be an extremely difficult balancing act – almost impossible for external 
actors to handle if they wanted to operate according to pre-established guidelines and 
benchmarks for their SSR projects. It is this lack of respect for national and local owner-
ship that provokes many commentators to say that the Sierra Leonean SSR model is partly 
a replica of the UK model, doubting whether this model will prove appropriate in the long 
term (Horn/Olonisakin 2006: 121). In fact, the interpretation and implementation of SSR 
norms, laws, and regulations already deviate today from the external model. This is partly 
due to the fact that the external actors did not look beyond the formal adoption of SSR 
norms (which was often the benchmark for their own activities and project proposals). 
Especially when it comes to the principle of civilian and democratic control of the security 
sector many observers fear that it did not take root and its observance is for now mainly 
due to the ongoing UK presence in the country (Horn/Olonisakin 2006: 120). Some of the 
oversight bodies instituted do not even convene while others do not act within the bounds 
of their intended area of responsibility. It was easier for the Sierra Leonean government to 
accept training and equipment for the security forces (thus providing stability) than to 
accept a system of checks and balances. It was also often difficult for local actors to absorb 
so many new procedures (Horn/Olonisakin 2006: 116). The reformed military law system 
provides a good example of this. While the only legal expert in the entire military law 
system was made ombudsman, proper functioning still hinges on the training of two Si-
erra Leonean officers to become military lawyers. Also, the (British) disciplinary and re-
dress system as well as the court martial procedural rules foresee a strong and active part 
in all their procedures by the commanding officer (CO). Yet, almost no CO has any grasp 
of his/her obligations under these rules. Furthermore, experts state that a true change in 
the mentality of the security actors has not occurred yet (von Gienanth/Hansen 2006: 5; 
Ebo 2004: 61). There is a façade of a functioning security sector, but the imported sets of 
norms do not appear to be adequate for the realities on the ground (Horn/Olonisakin 
2006: 110). While SSR policies, laws and regulations have successfully been aligned to 
global SSR standards,10 the introduction of these SSR norms does not necessarily acco-
momodate local adaptation so that SSR is effective and sustainable. Even though the SSR 
framework resembles its counterpart abroad, such reforms have differing meanings, are 
not implemented, known, or accepted. The adoption of SSR norms on paper and resis-
tance in practice thus results in an artificial exercise that often does not produce greater 
effectiveness in providing human security or building peace. External SSR norm entre-
preneurs, due to their established methodologies and benchmarks, are fixated on  
convergence of regulations, while national elites pick the SSR norms that most closely 
match their interests (for example, professionalism that increases the effectivity and effi-
 
 
10  This alignment has been achieved through processes of norm diffusion at three different levels: First, 
policy and strategy papers often introduce the broader SSR principles. Second, bilateral actors bring in 
their legal set-up from back home through detailed legal reforms. Third, the laws are operationalized 
through corresponding regulatory frameworks – an entry point used by external advisors in particular to 
institute their models because their implemenation is easier. 
20 Matthias Dembinski/Jörg Krempel/Berenike Schott 
 
 
cency of security forces). To put it differently, the British experts had to disrespect the 
procedural norm of national and local ownership in order to push the substantive SSR 
norms through while Sierra Leonean counterparts often asked for the respect of local 
ownership in order to dilute some of the substantial norms.  
3.4 SSR in Zimbabwe 
Calls for a reform of Zimbabwe’s security forces have been made ever since its independ-
ence. These calls have, however, become more vocal over the last ten years in which the 
democratic space has diminished ever further. Especially before and during election peri-
ods (the 2002 and 2008 presidential elections), it has become clear that Zimbabwean secu-
rity forces (the Zimbabwean Defence Force (ZDF), the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) 
and the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO)11) cannot be considered neutral (Chitiyo 
2009; Hendricks/Hutton 2009; Hendricks/Musavengana 2010). They tried to influence 
the election process on several occasions and have altered the outcome of the political 
struggle. The most well-known example is the statement reiterated by the Head of Staff of 
the ZDF arguing that the armed forces will never accept a president who has not fought in 
the independence struggle (thus pledging allegiance to President Robert Mugabe in his 
fight against Morgan Tsvangirai, the leader of the most important opposition party, 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)). There are many more examples of the secu-
rity forces not remaining neutral despite such neutrality being enshrined in the Zimbab-
wean Constitution. This lack of neutrality is rooted in Zimbabwe’s colonial past and the 
heritage of the liberation struggle (Chitiyo 2009: 2).12 This history has had an effect on the 
way security forces interact with other state institutions and society at large. Most notably, 
it is the baggage from the liberation struggle, for example ZANU’s need to operate under-
ground or abroad, that explains the lack of transparency and the security forces’ penchant 
for secrecy. This past is most visible in the veterans’ organisations that play a central role 
in today’s politics, especially in regard to land reform, as well as in the intricate relation-
ships between those who fought in the liberation struggle and the highest echelons of 
today’s state structures.  
In 2008, SSR was a prominent feature of the Global Political Agreement (GPA). This 
agreement was established after the last elections (2008) resulted in a political stalemate 
between Mugabe’s ZANU-PF and Morgan Tsvangirai’s MDC. The GPA installed Morgan 
Tsvangirai as Zimbabwe’s Prime Minister and described in broad terms a future process 
of political transformation, demanding, inter alia, that the Zimbabwean security forces act 
 
 
11  The gaps in terms of creating a democratic governance system for the security sector are considered 
greatest within the intelligence sector because of the lack of legislation and oversight measures (Chitiyo 
2009: 8f). 
12  Also problematic was the ZDF’s involvement in the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo and 
finally, the integration of war veterans who even today play an important role in Zimbabwe’s political 
process. 
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according to the highest standards of human rights and the rule of law. The South African 
Development Community, which had brokered the GPA, also took up the role of guaran-
teeing its implementation. SADC’s head of States nominated South Africa’s President 
Jacob Zuma as its facilitator (and mediator) for the political process in Zimbabwe, a post 
he held until the President of Tanzania Jakaya Kikwete was elected by SADC’s heads of 
states as the new facilitator for Zimbabwe in August 2012. Despite the provisions of the 
GPA, SSR has not really been embraced by Mugabe and his party, the Zimbabwe African 
National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). Instead, critics claim that ZANU-PFs lead-
ing role rests ultimately on the support of an unreformed, but directly controlled, security 
apparatus. 
In spite of this obvious resistance to change, SADC adopted a low-key approach, as-
suming that any reform of the security sector must be based on the consent of the parties 
involved and thus preferring behind-the-scenes negotiations. Jacob Zuma, too, shied 
away from any statement that might alienate him from Mugabe. 
It remains to be seen whether or not this approach will eventually bear fruit. While 
critics deplore the passive stance of SADC in the overall political process (Dzi-
nesa/Zambara 2010) and the snail’s pace of the SSR process in particular,13 optimistic 
voices refer to first steps in the right direction. Most notable in this regard has been the 
adoption of the National Security Act (April 2009) which established a revised National 
Security Council (NSC) – a new civilian oversight institution that demilitarized the old 
NSC and provides for multiparty representation (Chitiyo 2009: 35).  
The next step in the SSR process would be the adoption of a new constitution whose 
draft text has finally been developed (July 2012). The negotiations over the new constitu-
tion took so long precisely because of the disagreements between ZANU-PF and the op-
position over the issue of security sector reform and the devolution of power.14 Section 11 
of the draft Constitution demands that the police, the intelligence services, the army and 
the correctional services must act in a non-partisan manner and members of the security 
forces must be subordinate to the civilian authority of the country.15 Whether the consti-
tution will ever be adopted by referendum and enacted remains to be seen – according to 
recent reports ZANU-PF wants to renegotiate the draft text. 
At the time of writing, the main question in regard to SSR is whether reforms should 
take place before or after the next elections (scheduled for 2013). ZANU-PF and the 
security forces call for a postponement of SSR while Tsvangirai’s MDC made reforms a 
 
 
13  The Zimbabwean (2012): Lifting Zimbabwe sanctions might aid reform before elections. http://bit.ly/ 
THGBNh (16.11.2012). 
14  Financial Gazette (2012): GPA Negotiators Under Pressure. http://allafrica.com/stories/201207200919. 
html (19.11.2012). 
15 Tsvangirai, Morgan (2012): Remarks by the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, the Right Hon. Morgan 
Tsvangirai, to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra. http://allafrica.com/stories/ 
201207260219 .html (19.11.2012). 
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precondition for any credible and peaceful election.16 At this crucial moment, SADC (and 
the AU as the other guarantor of the GPA) is still struggling to define its position. While 
Lindiwe Zulu, President Jacob Zuma’s foreign policy advisor and a member of South Af-
rica’s facilitation team, argues that SSR has to be tackled before the next elections,17 Zuma 
seemed to be hesitating. As a result, SADC has not clearly stated whether SSR should take 
place before or after the elections. 
To summarize, we find that neither the European nor the African SSR efforts have 
been particularly effective. In Sierra Leone, the British efforts have been rather successful 
on the surface of doctrines, strategy papers and legal acts, but did not trickle down and 
did not affect the behavior of national actors. In Zimbabwe, SADC’s and especially South 
Africa’s SSR efforts remain somehow inconclusive. The limited success in both cases is 
not surprising. SSR is controversial, would fundamentally change the target country’s 
political power balance, thus often lacks national ownership and is therefore bound to 
meet open or concealed resistance. As a reaction to open resistance or delaying tactics, 
European actors usually ask for deeper reforms (and are easily satisfied with legislative 
reforms on paper and superficial reforms – demanding the incorporation of substantive 
SSR norms while also disregarding the procedural norms of national and local ownership) 
while African external actors shy away from applying pressure and thus tend to postpone 
SSR reforms. While African and European approaches differ, both seem to be limited in 
their effectiveness in promoting and supporting sustainable SSR. 
 
 
16  The Zimbabwean (2012): PM renews call for urgent security sector reform. www.thezimbabwean.co.uk/ 
news/zimbabwe/51402/pm-renews-call-for-urgent.html (16.11.2012). 
17  SW Radio Africa (2012): Calls for Govt to Prioritise Security Sector Reform. http://allafrica.com/stories/ 
201206100123.html (19.11.2012). 
Towards Effective Security Governance in Africa 23 
 
 
Conclusion 
This report contributes to the debate on the effectiveness of international peacekeeping 
and peacebuilding by addressing two questions: Firstly, do relevant international actors 
such as the EU and the AU uphold global norms and do they share a common under-
standing of these norms? Secondly, does the adoption of global norms at the declaratory 
level guide the actual behavior of either organisation and do these global approaches con-
tribute to effective policies at the local level? 
Our findings suggest a rather mixed picture. Concerning the first question, we find 
that both organisations do indeed adopt global norms to a high degree. The alignment of 
African and European doctrines on peacekeeping and peacebuilding with UN norms and 
scripts is promising and can be considered an indicator that a layered system of global 
security governance based on strong and connected RSAs could be both effective and 
legitimate. Yet, we also notice that both the EU and the AU interpret certain aspects of 
global norms differently. On the one hand, the AU promotes a more ambitious under-
standing of POC and SSR norms. The African organisation assents to a robust use of force 
in the defence of a peacekeeping mandate and calls for security sector transformation, 
instead of mere reform. On the other hand, AU doctrines demand strong African influ-
ence over the implementation of international peacekeeping and SSR efforts.  
Concerning the second question, we find that the adoption of global norms by the AU 
and the EU at the declaratory level does not necessarily result in increased effectiveness at 
the local level. Our cases suggest that taking global scripts applying them as effective local 
solutions might be hampered by three types of friction: 
(1) Global norms may suggest policy responses which do not fit local challenges and 
needs. Adherence to global norms encourages a ‘one size fits all’ mentality. In 
other words, actors tend to interpret specific challenges according to pre-defined 
categories and respond by following established rules and procedures, irrespective 
of the specific circumstances on the ground. In our case, evidence for this tenden-
cy is discernible with regard to European peacekeeping. Here, we observe a strik-
ing resemblance of the European approach to peacekeeping with UN doctrines 
and practices. Convergence goes well beyond doctrines and affects practices at the 
level of missions and individual units. This process, however, is not driven by ef-
ficiency criteria. It not only erodes the initial rationale for a division of labour be-
tween both organisations, whereby the EU would enrich UN peacekeeping with 
particular qualities such as robustness. Given the uncompromising nature of wars 
in some parts of this world (Reno 2012), this close resemblance might also ad-
versely affect the prospects of providing effective protection in peacekeeping. 
(2) Global norms are translated into practice by international actors but do not mesh 
with the traditions and interests of local actors and thus do not penetrate deeply 
enough to the local level to affect the behavior of respective actors. We find evi-
dence for this kind of friction in two of our cases: African peacekeeping in Sudan 
and Somalia and European SSR programmes in Sierra Leone. 
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Concerning peacekeeping on the part of the African Union, we find few indica-
tors that the ambitious African POC doctrine affects AU peacekeeping missions 
and the conduct of peacekeeping troops on the ground. In Sudan, AU troops re-
mained rather passive, even though the amended mandate authorized them to 
protect civilians. In Somalia, AU troops proceed with rigor, but are accused of not 
discriminating sufficiently between combatants and non-combatants. Our obser-
vations in the field of Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone point in a similar di-
rection. Western supported SSR programmes result in the incorporation of SSR 
norms at the level of national regulations but do not affect the behavior of rele-
vant local actors and do not result in a thorough reorganisation of the security 
apparatus.   
(3) Regional actors adopt global norms in formal terms but implement them in a way 
that compromises the intention of the norm. We find some evidence for this kind 
of friction with regard to SSR in Zimbabwe. It is too early to provide an assess-
ment of security sector reform in Zimbabwe and of SADC’s consensus-orientated 
approach. Nevertheless, one might well speculate that SADC’s attempt to find a 
solution by working with the Zimbabwean security forces might result in reforms 
which leave the existing power structures in place. 
These preliminary observations may not suffice to draw definitive conclusions yet. The 
adoption of SSR and POC doctrines in the African context occurred only recently, and it 
is too early to decide with certainty whether and to what extent these doctrines will even-
tually trickle down and affect behavior at the local level. The observations should, how-
ever, serve as a warning sign that harmonizing doctrines should not be confused with 
achieving greater effectiveness in practice. 
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List of abbreviations 
AMIS African Union Mission in Sudan 
AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia 
APSA African Peace and Security Architecture 
ASF African Standby Force 
AU African Union 
CAR Central African Republic 
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy 
CIO Central Intelligence Organisation 
CISU Central Intelligence and Security Unit 
CMCO Civil-Military Co-Ordination 
CO Commanding Officer 
CPDC Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation 
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy 
DAC (OECD’s) Development Assistance Committee 
DFID (United Kingdom) Department for International Development 
DFS Department of Field Support 
DISEC District Security Committee  
DPKO (The United Nations) Department of Peace Keeping Operations 
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo 
ECOWAS Economic Community Of West African States 
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy 
EU European Union 
EUFOR European Union Force 
GoS Sudanese Government 
GPA Global Political Agreement 
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross 
IMATT International Military Assistance Training Team 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
ISA Intelligence and Security Advisor 
JEM (Sudan) Justice and Equality Movement 
MACP Mititary Aid to Civilian Power 
MDC Movement for Democratic Change 
MINURCAT The United Nations Mission in Central African Republic and Chad 
MINUSTAH The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NSC National Security Council 
OAU Organisation of African Unity 
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
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OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Displacement 
OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
ONS Office of National Security 
OSCE Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
OSISA Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa 
PCRD Post-Conflict Reconstruction/Development Policy 
POC Protection of Civilians 
PROSEC Provincial Security Committee 
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
PSO Peace Support Operations 
PSOD Peace Support Operations Division 
RSLAF Republic of Sierra Leone’s Armed Forces 
RSO Regional Security Organisations 
SADC South African Development Community 
SADC PF South African Development Community Parliamentary Form 
SILSEP Sierra Leone Security Sector Programme 
SLM/A Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army 
SLP Sierra Leone Police 
SSR Security Sector Reform 
UN The United Nations 
UNMIK UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
UNOCI UN Operation Côte d’Ivoire 
UNSC UN Nations Security Council 
ZANU Zimbabwe African National Union 
ZANU-PF Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front 
ZDF Zimbabwe Defence Force 
ZRP Zimbabwe Republic Police 
